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A NEGLECTED QUA SOLUTION TO THE 
FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM OF CHRISTOLOGY
Jc Beall and Jared Henderson
We advance a neglected QUA solution to the fundamental problem of 
Christology. Our chief aim is to put the view on the theological table, leaving 
future debate to tell its ultimate fate. After presenting the view we measure it 
against standard problems that confront extant QUA views and also against 
objections peculiar to the proposed view.
1. The Fundamental Problem of Christology
The fundamental problem of Christology concerns the coherence of or-
thodox Christology (at least as given by the Council of Chalcedon). In 
particular, there is an apparent contradiction arising from Christ’s having 
two apparently contrary natures—the divine and the human.1 Richard 
Cross puts the problem crisply:
[T]he fundamental philosophical problem specific to the doctrine is this: 
how is it that one and the same thing could be both divine (and thus, on the 
face of it, necessary, and necessarily omniscient, omnipotent, eternal, im-
mutable, impassible, and impeccable) and human (and thus, on the face of 
it, have the complements of all these properties).2
In the same vein C. J. F. Williams writes:
The two assertions ‘Christ is a man’ and ‘Christ is God’ are prima facie op-
posed to one another. It seems impossible that they should both be true; and 
this impossibility is apparently a logical impossibility. It is no use therefore 
in discussing the Incarnation to appeal, as St Augustine did, to the Divine 
Omnipotence; tota ratio facti est potentia facientis; for it is not part of the Chris-
tian faith that God can do the logically impossible.3
1For present purposes we say that two natures (or, generally, properties) are contrary just 
if a being’s having both of them entails a contradiction. 
2Cross, The Metaphysics of the Incarnation, 453.
3Williams, “A Programme for Christology,” 515.
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An instance of the fundamental problem is the following argument 
towards contradiction, where the rationales for the premises point to or-
thodox Christianity (at least per Chalcedon):4
1. Christ is mutable.
2. Christ is immutable.
3. Therefore, Christ is mutable and not mutable.5
Many responses to this (and the other) arguments to contradiction are 
available. Perhaps the most popular response is in the family of QUA re-
sponses, which, as Timothy Pawl notes, “are all attempts to modify the 
statement so that the pairs are not apt [i.e., true] of the same thing at the 
same time in the same way.”6
2. Three Standard QUA Solutions
There are three basic (families of) QUA solutions to the fundamental 
problem, classified by the grammatical position of the (often hidden) QUA 
locution in a sentence S is F.
1-QUA: S-QUA-N is F, where N is a nature. Here, the QUA device ap-
plies to the Subject position, where “QUA divine” and “QUA human” 
each modifies the Subject (viz., Christ).
2-QUA: S is-QUA-N F, where N is a nature. Here, the QUA device ap-
plies to the Copula position, where “QUA divine” and “QUA human” 
each modifies the Exemplification relation.
3-QUA: S is F-QUA-N, where N is a nature. Here, the QUA device ap-
plies to the Predicate position, where “QUA divine” and “QUA human” 
each modifies the Property in question.
These QUA views are very well known in analytic theology and philo-
sophical theology generally. We have little to add to either the standard 
explanations of such views or standard objections against such views; we 
rely on recent discussion for review and criticisms.7
4Note that we treat “x is immutable” as entailing the (logical) negation of “mutable,” 
namely, “x is not mutable” (or, equivalently, where it is false that is logical negation, “it is 
false that x is mutable”). This, like so many elements of the problem, has been questioned, for 
instance in Pawl, In Defense of Conciliar Christology; but that being immutable entails not being 
mutable remains a common view—one that neither we nor the main QUA views question.
5We put “Therefore” in (3) to mark the conclusion, but the content of (3) is simply “Christ 
is mutable and not mutable.” We follow this convention throughout. We thank an anony-
mous referee for the suggestion.
6Pawl, “A Solution to the Fundamental Problem of Christology,” 62.
7We assume familiarity with the three standard QUA solutions. For recent discussion 
that reflects our own understanding of (and positions on) the standard solutions see Adams, 
“Christ as God-Man”; Cross, The Metaphysics of the Incarnation, chapter 8; Pawl, In Defense of 
Conciliar Christology; and Senor, “Incarnation, Timelessness, and Leibniz’s Law Problems.” 
We note that Pawl labels 1-QUA through 3-QUA as Subject, Copula and Predicate, respectively, 
and even labels our target grammatical position (see § 3) as Assertion; but Pawl’s view of the 
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3. A Fourth QUA Solution: 0-QUA
Our aim is to advance a novel QUA solution that, as far as we can tell, 
has been completely neglected in analytic theology and philosophical the-
ology generally. We do not advance or defend the given solution as the 
true Christological theory. Rather, we put it forward as a solution that is 
just as viable as other QUA solutions.
3.1 The Missing Position
The three standard QUA views concern sub-sentential parts of sentences: 
Subject position, Copula, and Predicate. In the abstract this leaves at least 
one more position that a QUA device might occupy: namely, applying to 
the whole sentence—a sentential operator. In keeping with the i-QUA labels 
above (see § 2) we call this fourth view 0-QUA:8
0-QUA: QUA-N: S is F. Here, the QUA device applies to the Sentence 
(position), where “QUA divine” and “QUA human” each modifies the 
Sentence—modifies the evaluation of the sentence.
But now the pressing question: how is “QUA divine” or “QUA human” to 
be understood in such a way that it makes sense as a sentential operator?
3.2 Natures and Stories: According To
It is natural to think of Christ’s divine nature as delivering (i.e., entailing) 
a true story of anything that exemplifies that nature, where “story,” in this 
context, need not be fiction—and isn’t fiction in the case of the story of 
Christ. Similarly, it is natural to think of Christ’s human nature as entailing 
a true story of anything that exemplifies that nature. Indeed, any nature 
delivers some true story of whatever possesses it—at the very least, the 
essential truths tied to that nature.
We advance the 0-QUA view along just such lines: namely, the QUA 
device is an according to Nature operator. In particular, Christ’s exem-
plification of two natures is accompanied by two distinct QUA devices: 
According to the Divine Nature and According to the Human Nature. The more 
standard (and perhaps more natural-to-the-ear) terminology of “story” 
may equivalently be used provided that the core stories in question are 
entailed by Christ’s two natures. Accordingly, one may think of the 0-QUA 
account as involving two sentential operators: namely, According to the Di-
vine Story and According to the Human Story.
3.3 The 0-QUA Solution
The 0-QUA solution to the fundamental problem notably varies from 
Pawl’s characterization of QUA solutions in that it does not “[attempt] 
latter is not what we have in mind at all (except grammatical position), and so we use our 
own terminology.
8For those to whose minds the familiar “in virtue of” idea springs we note that, while that 
view can—and perhaps should—qualify as a 0-QUA view with respect to grammatical position, 
we hope it is clear from the discussion below that such “in virtue of” ideas are not part of the 
0-QUA view as we advance it. (See § 3.3 and especially § 4.1 for further discussion.)
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to modify the statement so that the pairs are not [true] of the same thing 
at the same time in the same way.”9 Rather, the 0-QUA solution changes 
how we evaluate the embedded (viz., “QUA-unadorned”) statements: ac-
cording to our proposal we evaluate the target QUA-unadorned claims 
relative to nature-tied stories. The 0-QUA view maintains that according 
to the divine story Christ is not mutable, and that according to the human 
story Christ is mutable. There are two natures and thereby two stories 
of Christ; but it’s the one and only Christ in each of the two apparently 
incompatible stories.
As with all QUA solutions the explicit statement of the relevant truths 
requires the QUA device—in the 0-QUA view, the according to device. Any 
truth in “Christ is mutable”—similarly, “Christ is immutable”—is elliptical 
for an essentially QUA-involving claim (on our view, an according to device):
4. According to the human story: Christ is mutable.
5. According to the divine story: Christ is immutable (not mutable).
The central question: what of the alleged consequence (3)?
3. Christ is mutable and not mutable.
On the 0-QUA view this step is fallacious since there is no one nature that 
delivers a true story according to which Christ is mutable and not mu-
table. And that is critical. The two target stories (viz., divine and human) 
are normally thought to be “unionizable” (for lack of a better term) into 
one larger true story. But that this fails is precisely the lesson of the funda-
mental problem: namely, the true story of Christ is given not by the union 
of all nature-tied stories of Christ but is rather a set of logically consistent 
stories tied to Christ’s two (otherwise inconsistent) natures.
The uniqueness of Christ having two apparently contrary natures 
without a logically contradictory theology is going to involve something 
strange, a point on which all theologians and philosophers agree. On the 
0-QUA view the strangeness is reflected in the fact that while both (4) and 
(5) are true the union of the given nature-tied stories is untrue. Without 
the explicit QUA operator the relevant truths of Christ are not expressed; 
the according to operators are fundamental to telling the truth of Christ.
A dangerous analogy might be useful—dangerous if taken to be exactly 
the 0-QUA view in Christology. Related phenomena have a similar (not to 
say exactly the same) structure. Let “w” name a possible world in which 
cats are enormous, each weighing 4000 lbs. Take all the claims that are true 
of cats at w. That’s a true story in one clear sense: the claims in the story 
are all true, according to w, of something. But any target truth expressed 
by “all cats weigh 4000 lbs” is elliptical; it requires a 0-position operator, 
namely, that according to the w story, cats are enormous.
9Pawl, “A Solution to the Fundamental Problem of Christology,” 62. We do not believe 
that Pawl would thereby withhold the 0-QUA view from the family of QUA views. What 
Pawl’s characterization does is truly characterize the standard three QUA views—and we 
agree with his characterization of those views.
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We are not suggesting that the fundamental problem of Christology—
Christ’s apparently contrary natures—is solved by thinking that the 
natures are divided up into island-like possible worlds. (That’s the danger 
in the dangerous analogy.) But the loose analogy can be useful (if the 
danger is avoided). Natures can be thought of as delivering—entailing—
true stories of whatever exemplifies that nature. Normally—in fact, in all 
but the extraordinary case of Christ—we don’t bother invoking the ex-
plicit According to operator; normally there’s exactly one nature at issue, 
and nothing perplexing arises. But Christ’s particular two-natured being 
cries out for explicitly using the According to operator. That’s what the 
fundamental problem of Christology teaches us according to the 0-QUA 
account. The truth of Christ is QUA-adorned at a fundamental level.
4. Measured against Objections
The 0-QUA view is simple and, by our lights, at least as plausible as the 
other three QUA views. We now clarify the view by defending it against 
some objections.
4.1 A Non-starter?
Objection: The proposed 0-QUA view is neither new nor viable. There is a 
0-QUA view that is well known and rightfully widely dismissed, namely, 
where the 0-position device is an in-virtue-of-Nature operator. Timothy 
Pawl calls such a view a non-starter because it “doesn’t provide a way to 
avoid predicating ‘passible’ and ‘impassible’ to the same thing.”10
Similarly, voicing the widespread non-starter view, Senor writes:11
The first and most straightforward reading is “In virtue of being N, S is F.” 
Thus, understood this way, if one says “Qua God, Jesus Christ was omnipo-
tent”, one is saying that it is in virtue of his deity (or his divine nature) that 
Christ was omnipotent. . . . The difficulty with this interpretation of qua-sen-
tences . . . is that it does not solve [the fundamental problem].12
What Pawl and Senor (and others) are highlighting is that in virtue of de-
vices satisfy the following (extra-logical) entailment, “release”:13
6. In virtue of N: S is F.
7. Therefore, S is F.
And if this is the case the fundamental problem reappears.
10Pawl, “Conciliar Christology and the Problem of Incompatible Predications,” 97.
11See also Pawl’s further argument along these lines in Pawl, “Conciliar Christology and 
the Problem of Incompatible Predicates,” 93–94, along with discussions in Adams, “Christ as 
God-Man,” 254–255 and Cross, The Metaphysics of the Incarnation, 194.
12Senor, “Incarnation, Timeless, and Leibniz’s Law Problems,” 229.
13This is not a logical entailment because logic only speaks of logical vocabulary, and “in 
virtue of” is not part of logical vocabulary; however, the entailment would be one of an 
extra-logical consequence relation for theories (perhaps including theology) that involve the 
target in virtue of language.
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Reply: We agree with Pawl and Senor (as well as Adams and Cross) 
about the given entailments of relevant in virtue of devices. But our 0-QUA 
proposal is not an in-virtue-of proposal at all. We have offered a different 
account of (0-position) QUA clauses, where they are according to operators. 
According to operators do not support the problematic release entailment:
8. According to N: S is F.
9. Therefore, S is F.
This step is dubious right from the start. Our proposed 0-QUA position 
blocks this entailment, an entailment without which the target logical 
contradiction—the fundamental-problem contradiction—fails to arise. 
(See § 4.3 for more on inferential behavior of according to.) Accordingly, the 
0-QUA solution, unlike the in-virtue-of-N accounts, offers a solution to the 
fundamental problem of Christology.
Not only do we agree with Pawl’s claim, and similar claims made by 
others, that the in-virtue-of approach to a (0-position) QUA view is a non-
starter; we think that it can be strengthened. On our view the in-virtue-of 
approach offers not a solution to the target contradiction; it offers would-be 
explanations for the independent contradictory claims. Why is Christ mu-
table? What explains Christ’s mutability? Answer: Christ’s mutability is 
explained by his human nature; it’s in virtue of Christ’s human nature that 
Christ is mutable. Why is Christ immutable? What explains the immuta-
bility? Answer: Christ’s immutability is explained by his divine nature; it’s 
in virtue of the divine nature that Christ is immutable. What “in virtue of’” 
is doing is offering an explanation of how we get to the apparent contradic-
tion, not a resolution of the contradiction—which is why Pawl and many 
others are exactly right that it is a non-starter as a solution to the funda-
mental problem. It’s a non-starter to that problem because it stops at the 
starting line of the problem. In many ways the in-virtue-of 0-position “QUA 
view” is not really a QUA view at all; it doesn’t—as far as we can see—pur-
port to modify or operate on the embedded statement so much as explain it.
Like the other standard three QUA views our proposed 0-QUA view in-
volves a rejection of the would-be stand-alone truth that Christ is mutable 
(similarly, immutable); the truth is expressed only in QUA-modified form, 
where, on our view, the QUA device is one or another according to operator 
(namely, According to the divine story or According to the human story). More-
over, unlike the would-be in-virtue-of “QUA view,” our proposed 0-QUA 
view, just like the other three standard QUA views, does not purport to 
explain either the would-be stand-alone truth that Christ is mutable or the 
would-be stand-alone truth that Christ is immutable; it offers no explana-
tion of those would-be stand-alone facts because they aren’t (stand-alone) 
facts. The Christological truths are the QUA-adorned ones that explicitly 
advert to the nature-driven stories.14
14An anonymous referee points out that a possible QUA view could hold that some 
nature-tied stories release: the divine story could release and so “Christ is immutable” (un-
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4.2 Unadorned Truths
Objection: The reply to the “non-starter” objection (see § 4.1) suggests 
that no truths are true of Christ except ones that are QUA-adorned (i.e., 
0-QUA-prefixed). Is that the position?
Reply: The whole point of QUA views is that the fundamental problem 
of Christology arises from ignoring QUA devices—ignoring, so to speak, 
“QUA-lifications” implicit in the target truths. The 0-QUA account is no 
different. Again, any truth expressed by the QUA-unadorned “Christ is 
immutable” is elliptical for the explicitly adorned “According to the Di-
vine Story: Christ is immutable.” Moreover, as we have emphasized, there 
is no “unionizing” of the Divine and Human stories into a single, stand-
alone QUA-free true story. But this is not to say that no QUA-free truths 
are consequences of the QUA-adorned truths. The following principle can 
be incorporated into the true Christology without problem:
Nature Release: If both According to the Human Story: P and According to 
the Divine Story: P are true, then P itself is true.
The idea is that the QUA-unadorned sentences that are included in our 
total true theory of Christ are just those that are delivered by each of 
Christ’s nature-tied stories.
Here again the extraordinary case of Christ is made apparent. Typi-
cally, each person has a single nature—and so has a single true story. The 
single-natured case always satisfies a generalized version of Nature Re-
lease.15 Since P is true in every nature-tied story—in the usual case, the 
only nature-tied story—P is true even without a 0-QUA adornment. But 
Christ is fundamentally different from most persons; Christ has two very 
different natures and two very different nature-tied stories.
4.3 Unadorned Un-truths
Objection: The proposed 0-QUA account rejects that “Christ is immutable” 
is true (likewise for “mutable,” and so on). But, then, the 0-QUA view 
must hold that “Christ is immutable” is false. But, then, the 0-QUA ac-
count is just heresy; it accepts the falsity of Christ’s immutability. And so 
the proposed 0-QUA view fails to achieve a key desideratum: namely, to 
provide an orthodox Christology—a solution to the fundamental problem 
which is compatible with orthodox Christology.
Reply: We think that orthodox Christology demands that according to 
the divine story Christ is immutable; and the proposed 0-QUA view fun-
damentally accepts that truth. On no QUA view does orthodoxy demand 
adorned) would be true while the human story would not release and so “Christ is mutable” 
would only be true when understood as QUA-adorned. This would avoid the inconsistency, 
but we see no principled reason why some stories should release while others do not.
15Here is the generalized version of the principle, which we also endorse.
General Nature Release: Let N be a nature and x an individual. Let P be any state-
ment. Suppose that for every nature N that x has, it’s true that according to N: P. 
Then P itself is true.
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the truth of the QUA-unadorned sentence “Christ is immutable,” and to 
demand as much would border on question begging against QUA views. 
The only solutions that maintain the truth of the target QUA-unadorned 
claims are either contradictory16 or offer non-standard truth (falsity) con-
ditions for the given claims.17 Our concern in this paper is squarely on 
QUA views—and the neglected 0-QUA view in particular—and not on 
alternative approaches.
The current objection does raise a very important question: Is the 
QUA-unadorned claim “Christ is immutable” false since untrue? The ques-
tion demands a more explicit statement of what “truth” (similarly, “falsity”) 
amounts to in the 0-QUA account. Much of the answer is implicit in what 
we have said so far but the current objection invites an explicit statement.
4.3.1 0-QUA and truth-in-N. The fundamental problem of Christology 
arises from ignoring (implicit) 0-QUA devices. On the 0-QUA view the 
key devices are according to operators, each tied to a particular nature (viz., 
according to human nature, according to divine nature). Like according to 
operators in general, the key Christological devices do not release—that 
is, P is not entailed by the truth that (for example) According to the divine 
story: P. The key unadorned claims in the fundamental problem (e.g., 
“Christ is immutable,” etc.) are true in some but not all relevant stories; 
and the idea of being true-in-N (for nature-tied story N) is a key notion in 
the 0-QUA account.18
4.3.2 Stories as (modeled by) closed sets of sentences. For simplicity we 
shall think of stories as (modeled by) sets of sentences, and in particular 
so-called closed sets of sentences. Here, the “closure relation” is what-
ever entailment relation is required by the true Christology. For present 
purposes we shall greatly simplify by thinking of the given relation as 
all-possible-worlds entailment. Accordingly, a story is a set of sentences 
closed under all-possible-worlds entailment: if P is in the story and P 
all-possible-worlds entails Q, then Q too is in the story. (This is all that is 
meant by “closed under” for present purposes.)
4.3.3 Truth-in-N and falsity-in-N. Just as in logical studies, where the 
notion of truth-in-a-model (similarly, falsity-in-a-model) is the key notion 
of “truth” (similarly, of “falsity”), so too the idea of truth (falsity) in a story 
is key to the 0-QUA account in Christology. And here the definition is 
completely standard:
Definition 1 (Truth-In-Story-N): Let N be a story. We say that P is true-
in-N (or “true in the story N”) iff P is in N.
Hence, to say that “Christ is mutable” is true-in-the-human-story is to say 
(something modeled by the claim) that “Christ is mutable” is in the target 
16Beall, “Christ—A Contradiction.”
17Pawl, In Defense of Conciliar Christology.
18For simplicity we sometimes use “N” ambiguously over natures and the corresponding 
nature-tied stories, leaving context to clarify.
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story (where, again, stories are modeled by sets of sentences closed under 
a given entailment relation). Likewise, mutatis mutandis, for other claims 
involved in the fundamental problem of Christology.
Similarly, we invoke a standard definition of falsity in a story, where it is 
false that is logical negation:
Definition 2 (Falsity-In-Story-N):  Let N be a story. We say that P is false-
in-N (or “false in the story N”) iff the (logical) negation of P is in N.
Hence, to say that “Christ is mutable” is false-in-the-divine-story is to say 
(something modeled by the claim) that “It is false that Christ is mutable” 
is in the target story (or where “not” is logical negation, “Christ is not mu-
table” is in the target story). Likewise, mutatis mutandis, for other claims 
involved in the fundamental problem of Christology.
4.3.4 Truth as truth-in-all and Falsity as falsity-in-all. § 4.3.3 makes explicit 
the fundamental notions of truth-in-N and falsity-in-N. What of the target 
notions of Truth (simpliciter) and Falsity (simpliciter)? Here, we also 
follow a standard idea due to Bas van Fraassen.19
Definition 3 (Truth (Simpliciter)):  Let P be any statement. Then P is True 
(simpliciter) iff P is true-in-N for all relevant stories N.
Hence, to say that “Christ is mutable” is True is to say that “Christ is mu-
table” is true-in-N for all relevant stories N, including the divine story. On 
the 0-QUA view, that “Christ is mutable” is True should be rejected, as 
“Christ is mutable” is not true in the divine story.
Similarly, we invoke the corresponding false-in-all account of Falsity:
Definition 4 (Falsity (Simpliciter)):  Let P be any statement. Then P is 
False (simpliciter) iff P is false-in-N for all relevant stories N.
Hence, to say that “Christ is mutable” is False is to say that “Christ is 
mutable” is false-in-N for all relevant stories N, including the human story. 
On the 0-QUA view, that “Christ is mutable” is False should be rejected, as 
it is not false-in-the-human-story.
4.3.5 Unadorned sentences: recap. Note that we now have a sample 
QUA-unadorned sentence that, according to the 0-QUA account, is nei-
ther True nor False, namely, “Christ is mutable.” Yes, “Christ is mutable” 
is true according to the human story, but it is not True. And, yes, “Christ 
is mutable” is false according to the divine story, but it is not False. In 
this sense (and in this sense only) one should accept neither “Christ is 
mutable” nor its logical negation expressed via “Christ is immutable” (i.e., 
not mutable).
19van Fraassen, “Singular Terms, Truth-Value Gaps, and Free Logic.” We use uppercase 
“T” in “Truth” (similarly, “Falsity”) to flag the technical usage. We note that this usage, im-
portant for the true Christology (according to the proposed 0-QUA view), is compatible with 
some very general notion of truth which is completely independent from truth-in-N rela-
tions, etc. (Analogy: the many important notions of truth-in-a-model that are used in many 
important theories do not in any way threaten a general notion of truth which is independent 
from such notions.)
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We say that all QUA views should unite in a rejection of both “Christ is 
mutable” and “Christ is immutable” (QUA-unadorned just so), but in no 
way is such a rejection—as we see it—a rejection of orthodox Christology. 
Christology—the true Christology—is one whose nature-tied claims are 
explicitly or implicitly adorned; and it is with such adornment that the 
truths about Christ’s uniqueness may be expressed.20
4.4 Law of Excluded Middle
Objection: The 0-QUA view should be rejected since it needs to reject an 
important metaphysical principle for properties. Given the definitions of 
Truth and Falsity in § 4.3.4 the 0-QUA view is incompatible with the fol-
lowing excluded-middle principle:
Law of Excluded Middle for Properties (LEMP): For any object a, and any 
property F, either it is true that a is F or it is true that a is not F.
The 0-QUA view rejects such a principle inasmuch as it requires that for 
some QUA-unadorned sentence neither the sentence nor its negation is 
True. (Example: “Christ is mutable,” “Christ is not mutable.”) And this 
violates LEMP, which is both an important metaphysical (and, in turn, 
theological) principle and also an independently plausible principle.21
Reply: The objection is important but is not as severe as it seems. 
According to 0-QUA, “Christ is mutable” is not True and “Christ is not mu-
table” is not True; however, according to 0-QUA “Either Christ is mutable 
or Christ is not mutable” is True. To see this, recall that target stories in the 
0-QUA account are modeled by closed sets of sentences, with the target 
closure relation defined as all-possible-worlds-entailment. Accordingly, 
each story contains all necessary truths (and thereby all logical truths). 
We grant (for this discussion) that “A or not-A” is one such (schematic) 
necessary truth. Hence, since all necessary truths are in each target story, 
each target story contains each instance of the given (excluded-middle) 
schema; and so each story contains “Christ is mutable or Christ is not mu-
table,” and so—by definition of Truth—the given sentence (i.e., the given 
instance of the given excluded-middle principle) is True.
The objection, we say, does not point to a problem with the 0-QUA view. 
On the other hand, the objection is important in highlighting what might 
appear (to some) to be strange. One might think that if “Christ is mutable 
or Christ is not mutable” is True, then either “Christ is mutable” is True or 
“Christ is not mutable” is True. The 0-QUA account, for fairly straightfor-
ward reasons, rejects such a principle (viz., a principle according to which 
a disjunction is True only if at least one disjunct is True). As in § 4.3.4, the 
0-QUA account takes inspiration from supervaluationist treatments of var-
ious predicates, wherein Truth is defined as truth-in-all-valuations (or, in 
20We note that the explicit model of Truth (etc.) just given sits naturally with the Nature 
Release principle(s) in § 4.2.
21We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pressing this objection. 
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0-QUA terms, truth-in-all-stories).22 On a supervaluationist treatment of a 
particular predicate F, a sentence “a is F” can fail to be True and fail to be 
False when “a is F” is true according to one valuation but is untrue according to 
another. Similarly, “a is not F” will fail to be True and fail to be False when 
“a is not F” is true in one valuation and untrue in another. But since val-
uations, like the stories in the 0-QUA account, are (usually) closed under 
all-possible-worlds-entailment (or, in the formal development, closed at 
least under classical logic), then “Either a is F or a is not F” is true in all 
such valuations and hence, by definition, True. Accordingly, on the issue of 
excluded-middle principles, the 0-QUA account is no more nor less strange 
than any usual supervaluationist treatment of (some class of) predicates.
4.5 Humanity, Divinity
Objection: The 0-QUA account is just heresy. A desideratum is to main-
tain orthodoxy in a solution to the fundamental problem. The “solution” 
points out that the truth of orthodox Christology is not given in the 
QUA-unadorned claims
1. Christ is mutable.
2. Christ is immutable.
but rather in the explicitly adorned nature-tied claims:
4. According to the human story: Christ is mutable.
5. According to the divine story: Christ is immutable.
This is all in keeping with the standard core of QUA views: namely, resolve 
the apparent contradiction of Christ’s two (apparently contrary) natures by 
rejecting the QUA-unadorned claims while accepting the genuine QUA-
adorned truths. But the 0-QUA view is downright heretical. In particular, 
the 0-QUA view must reject the very divinity and the very humanity of 
Christ. Specifically, the 0-QUA account must reject the orthodox truths:
10. Christ is human (i.e., exemplifies the human nature).
11. Christ is divine (i.e., exemplifies the divine nature).
That the 0-QUA account must reject both of these orthodox claims is clear. 
On the 0-QUA account natures entail true stories, at the very least true 
stories of anything that has the given nature. Moreover, on the 0-QUA 
account the divine nature entails immutability while the human nature 
entails mutability. Accordingly, if “Christ is divine” is true then “Christ 
is immutable” is true: (11) entails (2)—and likewise for other entailments. 
Hence, if (11) is in the true Christology then (2) is too. But on the 0-QUA 
account (2) is not in the true Christology.
The upshot: the 0-QUA account not only fails to be compatible with 
orthodoxy; it is clearly heretical in its rejection of both the divinity and 
humanity of Christ.
22van Fraassen, “Presupposition, Implication, and Self-Reference.”
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Reply: Contrary to the objection, what orthodoxy demands is that 
according to the divine story Christ is divine, and that according to the 
human story Christ is human. To demand more is to border on begging 
the question against all QUA views, not just 0-QUA. After all, no QUA 
view can accept that “Christ is divine,” QUA-unadorned just so, is true 
without rejecting the entailment from it to, for example, the QUA-un-
adorned “Christ is immutable.” And while, at least in principle, any QUA 
view can reject the given entailment from the divine nature to the given 
nature-tied properties involved in the fundamental problem, doing so 
would (in practice) diminish the importance of QUA adornments. Either 
way, QUA views generally should treat the orthodox claim about Christ’s 
divinity—likewise, humanity—exactly as they treat the other target or-
thodox claims (e.g., “Christ is immutable,” “Christ is mutable,” etc.): 
namely, such central truths are themselves QUA-adorned.23
4.6 Multiplying Persons
Objection: An objection to 1-QUA is that it multiplies the persons of Christ. 
Any orthodox Christological theory rejects that Christ is two different 
persons—the divine Christ and the human Christ—and instead maintains 
that Christ is exactly one person who is both (“fully”) divine in nature and 
(“fully”) human in nature. Leo the Great writes that:
[One] and the same mediator between God and humanity, the man Christ Je-
sus, could both on the one hand die and on the other be incapable of death.24
The important point is that any orthodox Christology must say of the same 
person (viz., Christ) that he is both immutable and mutable. But the 0-QUA 
proposal looks to confront the same problem: it maintains that there are 
two different (and, indeed, apparently incompatible) stories of Christ, and 
thereby appears to multiply persons—the subjects of the apparently in-
compatible stories.
Reply: Our 0-QUA account does say of Christ that according to one 
story he is immutable and, according to the other, he is mutable; it says 
this of one person, not two. Christ—the one and only person at issue—is 
the subject of both target stories. That they cannot be consistently union-
ized is a mark of Christ’s strange (and unique) role and being.
Indeed, this may be the mark at which orthodoxy points to the ineffability 
of the hypostatic union of the two apparently contrary natures. It is a part 
of orthodox Christology that the hypostatic union is a mystery; thus, any 
good model of Christ’s exemplification of the natures can only be illumi-
nating up to a point. (If a model is so illuminating that the hypostatic union 
23An anonymous referee raises the point that some QUA views may not require that 
“Christ is divine” and “Christ is human” are QUA-adorned, provided that on such a view 
“Christ is divine” (unadorned) does not entail, e.g., “Christ immutable” (unadorned) but 
rather the related QUA-adorned claim. On these views, the relevant entailments are QUA-
adorned, thus avoiding the fundamental problem. This would be one way to develop a QUA 
account, though we know of no one who explicitly puts forward such a solution.
24Tanner, Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, 78.
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ceases to be a mystery, it fails to be a good model.) Our 0-QUA account 
shows that the hypostatic union does not lead to contradiction; however, 
the account leaves mysterious just how the hypostatic union happens.
4.7 Accidental Properties
Objection: What about accidental properties? On the 0-QUA view the es-
sential properties of a given nature are in that nature-tied story. But are the 
accidental properties in any of the nature-tied stories?
Reply: The proposed view is silent on whether accidental properties are 
to be included in nature-tied stories. As in § 3.2, the nature-tied stories, at a 
minimum, include the essential properties of their respective natures; but, 
for all that we’ve said, the nature-tied stories might include more.
Distinguish two versions of 0-QUA: namely, “permissive” and “strict.” 
A strict 0-QUA view holds that only the essential, nature-tied properties 
are in the nature-tied story. A permissive 0-QUA view holds that every rel-
evant story includes its nature-tied properties as well as all the relevant 
accidental properties.
For present purposes, we remain neutral between strict and permissive 
variants of 0-QUA, leaving debate over theological-cum-philosophical 
merits of the two views to future work.25 What’s important, for present 
purposes, is that such neutrality does not compromise the account’s via-
bility as a solution to the fundamental problem. The fundamental problem is 
a problem about Christ’s essential properties: there is an apparent contra-
diction in Christ’s having two (apparently contrary) natures, giving rise 
to apparently logically contradictory properties. But on either version of 
the 0-QUA account (viz., strict, permissive) no single nature delivers a 
story wherein Christ has incompatible properties, regardless of whether 
Christ’s accidental properties are included in the story.
4.8 Non-adjunctive Consequence
Objection: The 0-QUA view, as advanced, involves the idea that Christ’s 
nature-tied stories cannot be unionized to form a stand-alone true story 
free of QUA-adorned claims. This avoids the fundamental contradiction at 
the price of keeping the full story of Christ separated into nature-tied sto-
ries. A more natural approach would be to have a single (true) story where 
the fundamental contradiction—for example, the conjunction of “Christ is 
mutable” and its logical negation—does not arise even though each of the 
conjuncts is true in the story. This would involve a so-called non-adjunctive 
consequence relation for the true Christology, one where logical conjunction 
differs from the standard account by failing to be entailed by the given con-
juncts. (In other words, if ∧ is logical conjunction, then the non-adjunctive 
approach to consequence rejects that P ∧ Q is logically entailed by a story/
25An anonymous referee raises the point that if some of Christ’s accidental properties are 
contrary to some of Christ’s nature-specific essential properties, then this is a reason to adopt 
the strict 0-QUA view. We accept the conditional but remain neutral about which variant of 
the 0-QUA view to adopt.
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theory that contains both P and Q.) This approach avoids the fundamental 
contradiction at the heart of the fundamental problem of Christology, and 
even does so without any need for QUA decorations.26
Reply: We agree that theology might demand a non-standard account 
of logical vocabulary (though on the proposed 0-QUA view logical vocab-
ulary remains standard);27 and it might well be that logical conjunction is 
the best candidate for a non-standard account. We also agree that non-ad-
junctive consequence (entailment) relations are widely available and well 
understood in logical studies.28 What we reject is that the non-adjunctive 
route resolves the fundamental problem. Yes, the step from (1) and (2) 
to (3) in the target fundamental problem (see § 1) is logically invalid ac-
cording to the non-adjunctive account; but the spirit of the fundamental 
problem remains strong. In particular, the alleged virtue of having a single, 
stand-alone QUA-free (true) story of Christ is diminished by the fact that 
we have a logically contradictory story despite losing the fundamental 
contradiction. To be clear: define a contradiction to be the (logical) conjunc-
tion of a sentence and its (logical) negation. Define a contradictory story 
(or theory) to be a negation-inconsistent story (where negation is logical 
negation), that is, a story that contains both a sentence and its (logical) ne-
gation, regardless of whether it contains the corresponding contradiction 
(viz., the logical conjunction of the given sentence and its logical negation). 
Then the alleged virtue of the non-adjunctive approach is that we have a 
stand-alone QUA-unadorned story of Christ that contains no contradic-
tion—a fortiori, no fundamental contradiction. But how is this a solution 
to the fundamental problem if the given stand-alone story is nonetheless 
contradictory? We see no clear answer, and so reject the non-adjunctive 
approach.29
4.9 Ad Hoc and Irrelevant
Objection: Even if 0-QUA solves the fundamental problem of Christology, 
in that it avoids the apparent contradiction of orthodox Christology, it is 
suspiciously ad hoc, and it looks like 0-QUA will have few (if any) applica-
tions in other areas of Christology or theology.
Reply: Our focus is on the fundamental problem of Christology, and 
so we make no argument that 0-QUA solves other theological problems. 
But there is precedent for thinking that QUA adornments are needed in 
26We thank Susana Gómez for raising this point.
27Strictly speaking, issues arise if one generalizes logical entailment to so-called multiple 
conclusion entailment, at which point the peculiarity of a non-adjunctive account of conjunc-
tion is mirrored in some ways by the supervaluational (and so-called non-prime) features of 
True disjunctions (where Truth is defined per 0-QUA). But we flag this technicality only for 
those readers who balk at our claim that the 0-QUA account keeps to the standard account 
of logical entailment. (We say it does, provided that logical entailment is a single-conclusion 
relation, which we take it to be qua one of various closure relations.) 
28Jaskowski, “Propositional Calculus for Contradictory Deductive Systems.”
29We should emphasize that if one were to pursue a genuinely logically contradictory 
Christology then there is no obvious need for the proposed non-adjunctive approach, since 
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other areas of theology, or at least in other areas of Christology. Consider 
the relation of the Son to the Father in the Godhead. Aquinas writes that:
We are to understand that Christ is subject to the Father not simply but in his 
human nature even if this qualification be not added; and yet it is better to 
add this qualification in order to avoid the error of Arius, who held the Son 
to be less than the Father.30
And here we can understand Aquinas as endorsing a view like 0-QUA: it is 
true according to the human story that Christ is subject to the Father, but it 
is not true according to the divine story.31 And understanding it to be true 
(unadorned) that Christ is subject to the Father will, according to Aquinas, 
lead to the problems of Arianism. So, Aquinas recommends that in our 
Christological theorizing we ought to understand “Christ is subject to the 
Father” as QUA-adorned even if this adornment is not made explicit.32
Figuring out which claims about Christ require adornment is not an easy 
task. But this is par for the course in theory building: building theories of 
anything is difficult, and building theories of Christ, who is extraordinary 
in having two (apparently contrary) natures, even more so. Beyond being 
difficult the task is important: as Aquinas notes, figuring out which claims 
require QUA adornment can prevent errors such as Arius’s.
5. Closing Remarks
Our aim has not been to establish that 0-QUA is the best of the QUA 
solutions; our aim has been to advance 0-QUA as a genuine option to the 
standard families. We have argued that the 0-QUA solution to the funda-
mental problem of Christology has many virtues: it provides a natural gloss 
of QUA clauses as according to clauses; it requires no sub-sentential modi-
fications of sentences in our Christological theory; and it can overcome all 
of the objections leveled against other QUA accounts. We believe that the 
0-QUA account is at least as plausible as the standard three QUA views, 
and may ultimately be the best QUA approach. Future debate will tell.33
University of Connecticut
the point of a contradictory Christology is to accept that the fundamental “problem” of 
Christology is not in fact a logical problem at all. But in our current discussion we are setting 
aside the option of a logically contradictory Christology; our focus is on the QUA families 
that purport to resolve the fundamental problem in a logically non-contradictory fashion. 
30Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, III, q.20, a.11.
31See also Crisp, The Word Enfleshed, 6, where the subordination of the Son it taken to be 
the doctrine that Christ is subordinate to the Father (i) in his human nature, and (ii) during 
his state of humiliation. We do not mean to endorse Crisp’s particular theory—on which 
we remain neutral here—but we see Crisp as proposing something in the spirit of a 0-QUA 
view in another area of Christology, namely, in the relationship of the Son to the Father in 
the Godhead.
32Aquinas also makes this point in Summa Theologiae III, q.16, a.8.
33Acknowledgements: We thank Don Baxter, Aaron (A. J.) Cotnoir, Kristen Culbertson, 
Susana Gómez, Mengyu Hu, Grace Patterson, Graham Priest, Dave Ripley, Andrew Tedder, 
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